Januari 02, 2017
brokaw: thank you all very much. i�m tombrokaw, a member of the council, recently excised from the board of directors�(laughter)�term-limited.i know you know our distinguished guest, bob gates. i�ll talk about him a little morein a moment. we welcome all of you. this is a session thatis on the record. we have a teleconference under way as well. we�ll be hearing fromthose folks when the q&a session comes. and it is a paul warnke lecture. many of you arefamiliar, of course, with paul warnke�s distinguished and long career in national-securityissues. he was a member of what i call the greatest generation. he served in world warii, became a lawyer. and then in those days, as his generation did, he moved back and forthbetween his law practice and serving his country.
so it�s very appropriate that we have bobgates here today, because he continued that tradition as a son of the midwest. it turnsout he was born in the same hospital as jim lehrer in wichita, kansas, i just discovered.(laughter.) there was something about that hospital. he went to william & mary. and whenhe joined the cia at the very entry-level part of it, he was the first member of thatagency to rise to the top of the cia. we also know him, of course, as the secretary of defense.it�s been a long and distinguished career in public service. he�s now in the privatesector but moving back and forth in the public sector as well. he heads the boy scouts ofamerica, among other things. and he has never stopped giving back to his country.his latest book is called �a passion for
leadership,� about the lessons that he learnedas a leader and as someone who was witness to the best of his generation.so mr. gates, let me begin with a question that i�ve been thinking a lot about. we�reroughly the same age. it seems to me that our generation was the last one that felta real calling to have public service as a part of their life, whether they went intothe private sector and then went to the public sector and then came back again. it was anextension of the memories of world war ii and the kinds of people who were our mentorsgrowing up. is that an overstatement? gates: i think that�s�i think that�sright. and one of the concerns that i have is that i�ve seen, both in our militarybut also when i was president of a&m and now
as national president of the boy scouts, youngpeople are no less idealistic, i think, than we were, and in�even at the college level,no less and maybe even more committed to voluntarism and being engaged.but once they graduate from college, a lot of that goes away. so we now�there was anarticle in the wall street journal six or eight months ago that said that 30 years ago,30 percent of the federal workforce was under the age of 30. and today it�s 7 percent;so a quarter as many young people serving at the federal level.and i worry. and one of the reasons that i wrote the book is that part of the reasonfor that is that this generation is less tolerant of bureaucracy than we might have been, lesstolerant of hierarchical structure, of the
rigidity of a government organization, thelack of opportunity to contribute significantly at a young age, as they can do in many areasof the private sector. so i think one of the motivations in writingthe book is how do we�how do we reform and change a lot of these institutions that weneed but that have accumulated a lot of barnacles and no longer deliver the services to peoplethey were created to serve? and how do you use that to get young people more interested?you have a lot of�you have these schools of government and public service all overthe country. you�ve got the lbj school at the university of texas, the george h.w. bushschool of government and public service at texas a&m. you�ve got the maxwell programat syracuse. most universities, many universities,
have these programs of people who are interestedin public service. but the disconnect between when they leave those programs and when they�andgetting into government is pretty significant. and a lot of young people, i think, get intogovernment and then get frustrated and leave pretty early. and i think that�s a problemtoo. brokaw: well, with the new challenges beforeus domestically and internationally, obviously dealing with the upheaval in the middle east,jihadism, and dealing with�in a war that�s a clash of cultures as much as it is a clashof nation-states, the impact in our country domestically in every conceivable aspect ofhow we are governed and what we do in free enterprise, the digital impact just cannotbe overstated, quite honestly.
this generation is a generation that�s teachingtheir parents to drive when it comes to that kind of thing. so is that also a componentof it that we�re not�there�s a calcification at the institutional level in government,military, and even in the private sector, that doesn�t speak to the young people whoare not going to go stand in line somewhere and wait their turn?gates: no, i think that�s absolutely right. and, in fact, i was mentioning to you earlierone of the�in the last months that i was secretary i would talk to the chief of staffof the army and the commandant of the marine corps in particular. you know, these warsin iraq and afghanistan have really been small-unit wars, at least after the initial operationat least in iraq, and in effect the captains�
wars.and i would tell these generals�you know, i would visit a forward operating base inafghanistan, and here would be a u.s. army captain commanding 100 u.s. troops, training100 afghan troops, bulldozing roads, building schools, negotiating with the tribal elders,and fighting the taliban, and having the opportunity to be innovative, entrepreneurial, creative,making decisions. and i would say to these guys, you bring thoseyoung people back and put them in a cubicle doing powerpoints, you�re going to losethem. and that�s part�kind of is all a piece of the same problem. how do you keepthese young people, who are accustomed to living at the pace of the digital age, andput them into these big organizations that
move at glacial paces?brokaw: let me switch now to the campaign and the issues before the country in the national-securityarea, where we look to you for guidance and wisdom. you�ve been hearing proclamationslike we�re going to carpet-bomb the middle east and we�re going to build the militaryto the greatest military that has ever been known. whatever it takes, we�re going topour it into the military to make sure we get that job done. on the other side of thespectrum, the president gave the impression the other night in the state of the unionaddress that we�re doing just fine against isis, it�s not really a great threat towho we are or our national identity. as you look at all of that, how well is the countrybeing served by the real challenges that are
before us when it comes to jihadism, and nowthe upheaval and the cultural clash going on in the middle east?gates: well, i think the�i think middle school kids would be embarrassed by the levelof dialogue going on in the national campaign�(laughter)�about how we deal with the problems that we�refacing. i mean, i just�i think that these guys are making these�men and women aremaking these broad pronouncements. it�s clear they don�t know what they�re talkingabout. (laughter.) you know, you quoted them. we�ll make the sand glow and carpet bombing,bombing the shit out of them and things like that that i think one of the�i think theleading candidate said. (laughter.) this is not a particularly sophisticated level ofanalysis�(laughter)�of our�of the challenges
that we face.and the thing that i find disappointing, and i realize that politicians have to put spinon things and so on, but they do a disservice in not being honest with the american peoplethat taking on a problem like isis and the extremism associated with isis is complex,it�s going to be hard, and it�s going to take a lot of time, and it�s going totake some sacrifice. and there are no easy solutions, and there certainly are no quicksolutions. now, the worrying thing is they actually believe what they�re saying. (laughter.)and if that�s the case, we really are in trouble. so we�re in the situation wherethe optimistic interpretation is they�re just being cynical and opportunistic.i think that by the same token�i think that
the president has all along underestimatedisis, has underestimated the degree of fear that they have been able to provoke amonga lot of americans. and you know, i�ve talked to some people here in new york who are inthe travel business. and they say that travel to europe is off, and more new yorkers arevacationing or going to new england because they�re worried about their safety in europe.well, when you consider the statistics and the odds of being attacked, it�s basicallya psychological effect. and the president, i think, has completely misread the psychologicalimpact of these lone wolf attacks or of these, quote-unquote, �small-scale attacks,�that result in multiple casualties, that have been sponsored by isis or by people radicalizedby isis and acting as lone wolves.
so i think at the same the administrationhas underestimated the impact of isis and what it�s going to take to deal with isis,on the other side of the fence you�re getting these simplistic and, frankly, ridiculousformulas on how they�re going to take care of the problem. it�s inconceivable to methat they really do believe that that will solve the problem.brokaw: take us through our institutions, military and intelligence, and how effectivelythey have been able to adapt to this new kind of warfare that we�re dealing with. it�sasymmetrical, we all know that, but it�s beyond that. it�s not a nation-state war.we�re talking about a cultural war. we�re talking about a very nimble enemy in thatpart of the world, which is a lot more sophisticated
than a lot of people want to give it creditfor being in terms of how it finances itself, how it communicates with its potential members.do we have in the government�at the pentagon and at the cia�enough people who reallygrasp the nature of this enemy, have a real sense of the arab culture and the variousplayers that are out there, because it�s not uniform? you know, when 9/11 happened,there was that startling statistic that we had just a handful of arabic speakers, i think,in the cia at that point. gates: i remember we�after the fall of theshah in the carter administration we had something called the political intelligence workinggroup that met at the white house. and it was to assess, how did we miss a developmentof such extraordinary consequence? and we
went through the level of expertise in thegovernment. and at that time, the foreign service�now, this is 35 years ago�theforeign service had 2 offices in riyadh that spoke arabic. and they spent 40 percent oftheir time squiring around congressional delegations. (laughter.) and it hasn�t gotten any better.brokaw: really? not at all? gates: i would say�i would say that in themilitary and in the intelligence community�and i see mike here�mike hayden�i think wehave the skills and the�and the knowledge and the insights. i mean, i think that themilitary�i�ve stayed away from washington and really don�t get involved in anythingthere. but i have the impression that the military has been pressing for many monthsto do the kinds of things that gradually,
and i think reluctantly, the administrationhas begun to embrace about more help to sunni tribes that are prepared to resist isis, tothe kurds, getting more trainers in and at a lower level in the iraqi security services,forward spotters and things like that, more special operators.i think the military�s been recommending these kinds of things�which are an alternativeto sort of a big massive ground force, that have the opportunity to enable those who arewilling to resist isis. and i would say even providing weaponry directly to some of thesetribes, sunni tribes, and to the kurds to help them because of the challenges of workingthrough the baghdad government. but i do think that we have the talent. i think that theproblem more has been a political one in terms
of a reluctance to�on the part of the administration�torealize that this is a major challenge and that it does have a big impact around theworld. i would say, though, tom, that one of theproblems that we have that is systemic and has been with us for a long time, really sincethe end of the cold war, is that we have also, for many years, starved the civilian talentpool in the government, and particularly those involved in diplomacy, in aid, and in strategiccommunications. and i remember vividly, you know, in the cold war, and some of you whoare a little older in the audience remember, usia under edward r. murrow and people likethat. you had�you had usia libraries in every major city in the world. you had voiceof america, radio free europe, radio liberty.
and in addition to this panoply of thingson the overt side, you had cia covertly sending millions of copies of the �gulag archipelago�into the soviet union, and magazines, and things like that.so you had this wurlitzer of strategic communications that was a big part, i think, of success inthe cold war. that�s all been basically dismantled. and that whole big operation nowsits in a small corner of the state department. those are the people also that you need torely on in terms of how do you come up with a�with a digital response to isis? how doyou counter either directly or through other organizations the messaging that isis is sendingto the west, to europe and to the united states, that�s radicalizing some of these peopleand so on? and we�ve basically disarmed
that part of the national security toolkit.brokaw: i want to turn now to china, which is a national security issue as well. it�sgetting a much higher visibility. i remember the most unsettling thing that you said whenyou came back from one of your tours of china was the command and control protocol. youwould go to these remote outposts and the people who were staffing those remote outposts,with a wide array of very lethal weapons including nuclear, they had control over command. itwasn�t being done from beijing. now we hear that xi is trying to rein that in. is thatwhat you hear as well? gates: no, i think that�s absolutely right.i think�you know, i was very troubled when president hu was in office because�or inpower because we had a number of incidences
where we believe the people�s liberationarmy was acting independently of the political authorities in the country. we had prettygood information that the anti-satellite test that took place took place without the knowledgeof the civilian leadership, that the interference with the u.s. navy ship impeccable took placewithout the civilian leadership being aware of it. and i know for a fact that when theyrolled out the j-20 stealth fighter two hours before i was to meet with president hu thathe didn�t know about it. and so�but i think one of the big changesthat xi has made is there is no question in my mind at all that xi is totally in controlof the military in terms of they report to him and they don�t do anything that he doesn�tapprove of. that�s kind of a good news,
bad news story. the good news is command andcontrol�s been tightened up. the bad news is, when bad things happen, it�s not somerogue pla guy acting, it�s the leadership of the country that�s involved.brokaw: how do we get north korea under control? gates: (laughs, laughter.) i like to say thatwe�re now in our third generation of kims, and with each successive generation we�vebeen swimming in a shallower and shallower part of the gene pool. (laughter.) my worryabout kim jong-un is not only that he�s dangerous, but that he�s stupid. (laughter.)i mean, we have� brokaw: but he�s got a great haircut. imean, you�ve got to get him that. gates: he has a hell of a haircut. (laughter.)we know�we know pretty well now that he
was behind the sinking of the south koreanwarship, the cheonan; that he was a leading figure behind the artillery barrage on thesouth korean islands, as he was basically trying to prove his mettle to the north koreanmilitary leadership, that he was tough enough to take on the job. the challenge that wehave is the reality that china has influence in north korea, but it doesn�t have control.and there was an episode during one of the previous famines in north korea where thechinese were sending gondolas�railcar gondolas full of food into north korea and the northkoreans were stealing the railcars, wouldn�t send them back to china.and so i think�i think this is a very dangerous situation. this guy, he�s developing a road-mobileicbm. he clearly is on�he wants to develop
a hydrogen weapon. i think�my guess is hedoesn�t have one yet. and so it�s a very difficult situation. and i think the problemwe face with regimes like iran is that they see how easily saddam was overthrown becausehe didn�t have nuclear weapons, how easily gadhafi was overthrown by a ragtag army withwestern air support, but how carefully we deal with north korea, which has maybe a halfor dozen or so pretty crude nuclear weapons. but they keep working at this. they keep�they�reworking on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and that capability. and, you know, they havethese successive failures, but eventually they�re going to get it right. and that�sgoing to be a very dangerous situation. all of which is diagnosis without a prescriptionfor how you solve the problem.
brokaw: we know that president putin of russiahas identified donald trump as his favorite presidential candidate in america, and trumpwas very happy to receive that kind of an endorsement. if the president of the unitedstates now or in the future called you and said, how do we deal with him and with russia,especially now that its economic situation is getting every more perilous and that�sa prescription at some point for something happening from the ground up, how would youdeal with putin? gates: well, i�president bush famously saidthat he had looked into putin�s eyes and seen his soul. after my first meeting withputin in february of 2007, i reported to president bush that i�d looked into putin�s eyesand i�d seen a stone-cold killer. maybe
that was just a cia-kgb thing. (laughter.)but i think the�i think the backdrop to understanding putin is that we have�we gravely�atthe time gravely misunderstood or underestimated the magnitude of russia�s humiliation withthe collapse of the soviet union, because it wasn�t just the collapse of the sovietunion, it was the collapse of the russian empire. and russia�s borders today are roughlywhat they were before the reign of catherine the great, without central asia, without ukraine,and so on. and putin feels that humiliation very much to the marrow of his bones, andit�s his understanding of that that i think is at the core of his popularity in russiaand his determination to reassert russia�s role in the world, russia�s role as a greatpower, and to assert russia�s interests.
he is determined that no problem will be solvedwithout russia being at the table, and i would say in syria without russia being in the chair,and as is evident also by the chemical weapons proposal that he made a couple of years ago.so i think�i think the�and then the second piece for putin is as old as the russian empireitself, and that�s creating a buffer of friendly states or at least frozen conflictson the periphery of russia as a buffer for russia. and so the actions that he�s takenwith respect to georgia and certainly with respect to crimea and eastern ukraine, andthe pressures that he�s put on�that he�s put on other countries in that region.so i think that�i think the thing to appreciate about putin is his determination that russiabe involved in all of these problems. and
of course, now the europeans, seeing the rolethat russia might be able to play in the middle east, there is a growing sense in europe maybewe ought to lift these sanctions that have been placed on russia.how long putin can continue his policies with growing economic estrangement from the west,i don�t know the answer to that question, but it�s�those pressures have to be building.and so you have the pressures with�caused by those sanctions, but then turkey had becomea significant trading partner with russia, and all of a sudden, after the shooting downof the russian airplane, putin say, ok, we�re going to cut off these ties with turkey. andit reminded me in the scene in that movie �monty python and the holy grail,� wherethe knight gets an�loses an arm and he says,
eh, �it�s just a flesh wound.� (laughter.)you know, i mean, how many of these flesh wounds can russia take economically beforeit really does begin to have an impact in terms of stability at home?brokaw: and before we go to questions, europe, our old alliance. what�s the future of thatalliance and the reliability of it as we go forward with these very vexing problems�sanctionswith russia, what we�re going to do about the middle east?gates: well, i think�i think europe fits into a broader point that i�d make, thati think we face a multiplicity of challenges in terms of national security and internationalstability unlike any that i�ve seen in my�since i joined the government 50 years ago justin terms of the number of these problems that
are all a-boil at the same time. i think�ithink that europe is facing some huge challenges. it faces significant economic problems. theeu itself is beginning to fray. the eu has, for the most part, always been an elite projectin europe. most of the time when it�s gone to popular votes it�s lost. and so you havethe problem brought on by the refugees. you have the problem brought on by the differencein economic performance between southern europe and northern europe, between germany and virtuallyeverybody else. and then�and then the�i think the very difficult question and thereal possibility that britain will exit the eu later this year. so i think the eu facesa lot of challenges, and particularly as a result of the immigration and refugee crisis,the potential that the borderless europe may
soon disappear as countries begin re-erectingborder fences and guard posts and things like that. so i think europe faces some prettysignificant challenges, and they have real implications for us.brokaw: all right, let�s go to questions. we have some from the teleconference crowdas well, but we�ll begin in the room here. remember there are microphones. introduceyourself. and make it a question, if you will, not a proclamation. and try to do it as economicallyas possible. right here in the second row. we have a microphonecoming, sir. q: thank you.mr. secretary, following up on your remarks about iraq�brokaw: can you tell us who you are?
q: oh. i�m roland paul, a lawyer; been inthe government before. as you know, general odierno, and presumablyother military leaders, wanted to keep 30,000 troops in iraq in 2011. and i know you didyour best to keep 10,000 there. to what extent today, facing isis, would the situation iniraq be different if either one of those levels of troops had been maintained?gates: well, first of all, i felt at the time�i mean, the proposals on the table, while iwas still in the government, were 20,000 troops and 20,000 state department. and i felt bothwere completely unrealistic; that the iraqis would never agree to that and the congresswould never agree to pay the bill. so the proposal that we were working on and thatgeneral austin had at the time was a proposal
for about 8,000 to 10,000 u.s. troops.i think that one of the things people underestimated, even as we drew down from the surge and thelarge numbers of troops that we had in iraq, was the political influence our senior militaryleadership had there. and as long as there was a substantial troop presence, it gaveweight to that political influence they had, so that when these different sectarian leaders,the sunnis and the shia and the kurds, would get into one of these knots, as they oftendid, where they were making no progress on anything, the ability of our senior generalsto bring them all together under u.s. auspices for a dinner or a meeting, and in essenceforce them to talk to each other, and i think helped moderate those conflicts and keep themfrom getting out of control.
once we fully withdraw, there was no governoron those kinds of conflicts. and so they could just run unconstrained. and so i think havingno troops there certainly had security implications. but i think the political implications interms of harnessing to a degree, at least at the government level in baghdad, some ofthe sectarian conflict is underestimated. and we lost that. and once we were out, malikiin particular was allowed to essentially follow his own instincts, which were all bad.and i think, for example, on the military side, we had trained and i think probablyhad some influence in the selection of a lot of the senior officers in the iraqi securityservices. and they were pretty good. they were pretty competent. all those guys malikireplaced, and they were all replaced by a
bunch of political, incompetent, corrupt hacks.and so if you ask why the soldiers wouldn�t fight in mosul, they were not going to fightfor these leaders in their own military. so i think it�s the�i think one of thebig impacts of our having nobody there, very, very few people there and no really seniorofficer, was the moderating effect we were able to have on iraqi politics.brokaw: we have a question from kristina wong of the hill in washington. why has the presidenthad such a difficult relationship with the department of defense? he�s had three defensesecretaries leave office�you, leon panetta, and chuck hagel�all of whom had fairly similarcritiques of the administration, which they didn�t hesitate to go public with.gates: well, i will say, first of all, that
i had my issues with the white house, butmy decision to leave was�i mean, i stayed longer than i intended by a long shot. whenhe and i�when president obama and i first talked, it was with�i put on the table,well, why don�t we just say a year? and as i wrote in �duty,� i put a period onthat sentence and he put a comma. (laughter.) and i stayed for a year and a half after that.and as recently�i mean, as close to my departure as maybe three or four weeks out, he saidare you sure you won�t change your mind and stay? i�d like to have you stay throughat least the end of the first term, and for as long as i�m president if you�re willing.and i would�by that time i�d done the job for four and a half years. that was longerthan all but four of my predecessors. and
i was exhausted. we�d been four and a halfyears at war, and i was ready to leave. in the four and a half years since i left�soi was there four and a half years. in the four and a half years since i left, as youpoint out, there have been three secretaries. one of the problems that i faced and thati wrote about, as did leon and chuck hagel talked about, is micromanagement from thewhite house. and i think that�you know, i think a good example�and i don�t knowthis for a fact, but i�d be willing to wager that i�m pretty close to being right�ithink the white house was very much involved in the delays and in the handling of the freedom-of-navigationexercise in the south china sea. we should have sent a ship into those waterslong before we did. and i would bet anything
that the white house said here are the rulesof engagement that made it look more like innocent passage rather than a freedom-of-navigationexercise. there was a direct line to a white house stafferwhen i visited a special operations command center in afghanistan. there was a directline to a white house staffer. and i stood there and i said you rip that out while i�mstanding here and watching. and i told our commanders; i said if you get a call froma white house staffer or an nsc staffer, you tell them you�re not authorized to takethe call and refer them to my office and tell them i said to go to hell. (laughter.)i worked on the nsc under henry kissinger, zbigniew brzezinski, and brent scowcroft.and i will tell you that had i called a four-star
commander as an nsc staffer, i�d have beengone the next day. i�d have been fired instantly. so this micromanagement is a problem. and,i mean, my view�and frankly, one of the main lessons in the book�is you have tochoose your subordinates carefully, but then you have to empower them, hold them accountable,and if they don�t do the job, get rid of them. but above all, you can�t micromanagethem. brokaw: question from the audience; rightback here. yes. remember, tell us who you are.q: joel mentor from barclays. thank you. my question is about the russian-iranian relationship.so we know in syria their interests are aligned but not necessarily identical. and now withiran coming back on the market, they�re
actually competitors for supplying energyto europe, and also with iran and possibly working greater economic cooperation withturkey and so forth. so i just wanted your thoughts on what you think. are there anyfractions there, things that we can probably take advantage of?gates: i think that there are some long-term potential problems between russia and iran.but right now they seem to be cooperating pretty closely. the russians have�you know,they had promised president bush�putin had promised president bush not to sell this newair-defense system, the s-300 or 400, to the iranians, because it obviously would haveseriously complicated any military operation to try and take out their nuclear capabilities.and putin agreed not to sell them and then
subsequently broke the contract.well, they�ve now reversed that and are selling those systems, and probably otherweapons, to iran. and now that the sanctions are being lifted, my guess is that that flowwill increase pretty dramatically, given how starved the iranians have been for new militaryequipment for a very long time. i think that�and so you have the russiansnow aligned with the shia-dominated iran and the shia-dominated government in syria. andi think that, you know, the administration keeps talking about putin getting himselfinto a quagmire. he�s made a terrible mistake, and so on and so forth. i think in the shortto medium term that totally underestimates the effectiveness of what putin has done.as condi rice and i wrote in an op-ed some
months ago, diplomacy is determined by thefacts on the ground, not vice versa. and the russians are helping the syrian governmentchange the facts on the ground. now, they�re not�putin is not at all a sentimentalist.if he finds another syrian who will maintain the close relationship with russia, who willcontinue to give russia access to the naval base at tartus, i think he�d dump assadin a heartbeat. but the point is that i think�i think his collaboration with the iranians,with the syrian regime is working pretty well for him right now in terms of diplomacy, interms of what i was saying earlier about russia asserting its role and its influence.but long term, i think he has made a mistake, in the respect that most of the russian muslimsare sunni and most of the muslims in the world
are sunni. and he�s aligned with a minorityelement of the islamic world. so that may come back to bite him sometime in the future.but i believe in the near to medium term, the relationship with iran will continue togrow. i don�t think that the oil competition issue will be a major one between them. andi think that you will see putin continue to play the kind of role he has, particularlyin syria. brokaw: a place where you once worked toldme recently, someone there, that they have other issues in russia as well, that the jihadistmovement under the banner of isil is moving out of central asia up into russia, and ofcourse they�re putting a lot of pressure on the western border of china.gates: i do think that the russians and the
chinese are both worried about isil and aboutislamic terrorism. i don�t think�i do think that putin would like to see isil controlledand contained and destroyed. i think they do see isil as a�as a danger to them. iremember the soviet defense�or, the russian defense minister once told me, he said, youknow, the iranians don�t need a missile to get a nuclear weapon into russia. and theterrorists don�t need�it�s not as hard for the terrorists to get into russia, asit is for them to get elsewhere�into other countries. so i think�i think putin�idon�t doubt putin�s desire to see isil destroyed. but he�s pursuing a path wherei think he thinks the way to do that is to empower assad.brokaw: edwin smith from university of southern
california gould school of law wants to takeour attention back to china. the evolving conflict in the south china seabears serious attention because it reflects the conflicting national interests of at leastseven states over the security of $5 trillion in international trade, plus the potentialdevelopment of hundreds of millions of barrel-equivalents of oil and natural gas in that part of theworld. how does that evolve? gates: well, this is�and i will say, i thinkchina�s the one area where at least up until now the united states has had a pretty goodstrategy, and it has had substantial bipartisan support. so the linage, if you will, fromnixon�s trip to the normalization of relations under president carter, president reagan embracingthe relationship as it was handed to him,
and then up to the present. it�s difficultto tell what the current crop of candidates might do�(laughter)�but it seems to methat�i don�t believe that china has any intention of engaging in a global arms racewith the united states. i do believe that they intend to establish regional dominanceand believe that that is�that comports with their history and their role in the world.as i like to say, people talk about the emergence of china. i prefer to talk about the reemergenceof china. it was a great civilization and a great power for a couple of thousand years.granted, they had a couple of bad centuries, but�(laughter)�let�s just say, theytake the long view. and i do worry, on the military side, by 2020 the chinese will haveabout 350 surface warships and submarines.
and the united states will have about 70 inthat region. and as someone once said, at a certain point quantity begins to take ona quality all of its own. and so i am concerned about that.but i do believe that with careful management of the relationship, and given the chineseinterest in avoiding an out-and-out conflict, that we can assert our rights�if we�refirm, and if we have enough military presence out there to be credible, that we can assertour rights at the same time that we acknowledge china�s influence and role in the regionand in the world. brokaw: a question from the audience. let�sgo way to the back. yes, sir. yes, stand up. there you are. tell us who you are, please.q: jason sherman, from inside defense.
mr. secretary, i�d like to ask you a questionabout the pentagon�s modernization program. the next administration is going to face somemajor challenges, particularly with regard to recapitalizing the nuclear triad. the pentagon�sacquisition executive frank kendall earlier this spring estimated that dod is going toneed something on the order of $10 to $12 billion more in its base budget, beginningin 2021, to pay for that portfolio of capabilities. with the defense budget right now at about$525 billion in the base budget, i�m just wondering how you think the�that portfolio�orhow do�you know, just how dod is going to�what the way forward is, given that under the sequesterdod has�is on track to absorb about $800 billion in cuts over the 10-year period, andif you see any room for the defense budget
increasing in the timeframe that dod needsit? gates: yeah, i think we need to actually see�thesituation for defense is actually worse than you describe. (laughter.) so i�in 2009,2010, i cut about 3 dozen major procurement programs that had they been built out fullyover time would have cost about $330 billion. we then launched what we called an efficienciesexercise in 2010 and identified about $180 billion in overhead that could be cut. now,i agreed to give�i told the services: you identify overhead that can be cut, headquartersthat can be consolidated and so on, and then if you can identify real military capabilitieswhere you would like to invest the money, i�ll give you the money back. but it�sgot to be for tooth, not tail.
the bottom line is, that in that�those twoyears, we cut the defense budget by about $400 billion over a 10-year period. presidentobama in april of 2011, as part of the budget exercise, said: i want you to do that again.so that was another $400 billion. that ended up being more like, i think, $485 billionrather than 400. so before sequester, the defense budget had been cut by about $850billion over a 10-yer period. sequester then put another $500 to $600 billion worth ofcuts on the table. so it�s more like a trillion and a half dollars over a 10-year-or-so period.the first thing that�s wrong with the way we do defense budgeting is the lack of predictability.in the last 10 years, the department of defense has had a defense appropriations at the beginningof the fiscal year twice. and that was nine
and 10 years ago. every year they have begunwith a continuing resolution and/or sequester. so one of the problems in figuring out howto fund long-range investments in defense, whether it�s shipbuilding or whether itsmodernizing the triad, is predictability in the budget. and here, congress is basicallyat fault. and until they can provide some predictabilityin terms of not just getting appropriations in a timely way but on what the rate of growthwill be looking out five or 10 years, it�s going to be very difficult to manage thesemodernization programs. i think that there is still a lot of overhead in the departmentthat can be cut. and one of the points that i make in the book is that actually timesof austerity are great opportunities for the
reformer because it provides an incentiveto change the way you�re doing business. so whether you are consolidating combatantcommands or doing a lot of things differently, these kinds of budget circumstances providean opportunity for somebody who�s bent on changing and reforming the system.but i think that you�the american people and the congress has to realize, for example,on the navy side, that the ships that were built in the reagan era are aging out, andso there�s a�there�s a modernization process that has to take place in the navy.the air force is operating with the oldest planes we�ve ever had in our inventory�ourbombers, our tankers, our fighters, you name it. now, we are building the f-35. we arebuilding a new tanker. but we�re just getting�really
beginning to get those programs moving.so i think, you know, you can debate how much the defense budget needs to grow. i thinkthe defense department, if given the opportunity and the flexibility, could find money internallyby cutting overhead to fund some of this modernization. but i also think there needs to be a predicablerate of growth, whether it�s 2 percent or 3 percent a year. and if you gave the defensedepartment that and you promised and delivered, that they could count on that for 10 years,i think they could manage these modernization programs.brokaw: other questions? yeah, right behind the pillar�or right in front of the pillar,i�m sorry, right there. you�re walking up to him. yeah.q: thank you for your service in government,
secretary gates. i�m amit sharma, empowermentcapital and former u.s. treasury department. i was intrigued by a statement you made earlieron the underinvestment or lack of investment in empowering agents, usaid and others. ifyou could comment on how do we reverse that trend�how do we look at strategic investmentsnot only within the part of the u.s. government�usaid, ex-im bank, opic, and other institutions�butalso to enable commercial endeavors in areas of high risk, conflict, post-conflict, thatcan then complement our broader security and foreign policy objectives?gates: well, it�s fundamentally political. i mean, it�s�there is no thought behindit. it�s just, we don�t want to fund those things. and everybody here knows that foreignaid has a dirty�is like a dirty word on
capitol hill. and, you know, if you want to�ifyou characterize it as just shoveling money at foreign countries, then that�s probablydeserved, but i think we�re a lot smarter than that.i think it�s a�i think it�s a vicious circle. i think presidents and omb don�tagree to increases in the state department budget because they�re convinced the congresswon�t approve it, so why put the�why take money away from something else to add to thestate department numbers when the�when the congress will just take it away? it�s alot easier to put more money in a failing program in the department of defense thanto give these guys anything. so i think what it requires is really some committed, visionaryleadership in some key roles on capitol hill,
and a president with the courage of his convictions.now, the state department did get some significant budget increases, as i recall, during thebush administration, and they were able to add some additional foreign service officersand so on. but, you know, as condi rice used to remind me, i have more people in militarybands than she had in the foreign service. (laughter.) or, to put it another way, ifyou took every foreign service officer in the world, you wouldn�t have enough peopleto crew one aircraft carrier. so, you know, the disproportion in what�s spent on themilitary and what�s spent on the civilian side of the toolkit is vast, and that�seasy to explain. but the reality is marginal investments on the civilian side could yield,in my view, disproportionate benefits. but
it�s going to require somebody on the hillbeing willing to take some leadership and understand the importance of that.brokaw: in our digital world, how confident are you that we�re able to secure our mostimportant secrets? mike hayden�s sitting here in the front row.gates: well, i�you know, mike may disagree with this, but i think�i think we do a prettygood job of protecting the classified networks in the defense department. and we have�westarted a program where we extended that umbrella to defense contractors on a voluntary basisbecause they had to give us some information so that we could help protect their networks.i think that�and i�m in dangerous ground here because mike was not only director ofcia, but director of nsa�but i think that�i
think we have the technical capabilities toprotect ourselves, but the government and the privates sector are completely wrappedaround the axel in terms of figuring out how to make it happen.and it�s not a partisan issue. it�s one of the few issues that�s not partisan. you�vegot republicans that disagree with each other, democrats that disagree with each other. you�vegot differences within the executive branch, both in the bush administration and the obamaadministration. you have major differences between private business or business and thegovernment in terms of how much information business is willing to share. and the resultis we�re kind of nowhere. now, i cut a deal in july of 2010 with secretaryof homeland security janet napolitano in the�in
the belief that, you know, a lot of puritans,civil liberties and privacy puritans, say, well, we�ll wait for a civilian nsa to becreated, and that�ll protect our networks. and my attitude? it ain�t ever going tohappen. there isn�t enough money, there isn�t enough time, and there isn�t enoughhuman capital. so, how do we use nsa to protect our domestic networks?so what janet and i came up with was i allowed her to nominate and appoint a deputy directorof nsa who would have his or her own general counsel and would have the authority to tasknsa real-time if there were a threat to domestic networks. we got the president to agree tothis. we did it all in about three weeks. we ignored the rest of the bureaucracy. itgoes to a point in the book. by ignoring the
rest of the bureaucracy, we probably guaranteedfailure�(laughter)�because, even though the president had approved it, the bureaucraticforces came back and, as i like to say, we parted the bureaucratic waters momentarily.and it was only a few months before they closed back over again and were basically back wherewe started. but we have to figure out a way to arriveat some consensus in the government, both the executive branch and the�and the congress,and also the business community, before we�re actually going to be able to use the toolsthat we have to protect our networks. brokaw: one last question, and if we can makeit as economical as possible. right here on this side. we haven�t gotten to this sectionyet. no, right here.
q: my name is donald shriver. i�m the formerpresident of union theological seminary, and i�m also a world war ii draftee.one of the great changes that has happened since my being drafted is that this countryis now on a kind of permanent war footing, and i should think that the morale of bothour troops and our civilians depends a great deal on the possibility that there can bean end to the war. it would seem that the conflicts we are now engaged in have no end.what would passionate leadership require, both toward us as civilians and toward themorale of our troops, in order to deal with this problem?gates: well, i think part of the problem is the�is the nature of the�of the threat,the threats that we face. most of our�most
of our military activities today are not incombat. they are deterrence. they are presence. where we are in combat today is in very limitednumbers in dealing with the lingering extremist problem in afghanistan and the problem ofisis that is mainly located in syria and in certain parts of iraq. the numbers of ourforces that will be engaged directly in those conflicts i think will, in the foreseeablefuture at least, be a�be a pretty limited number of people. but there is no denyingthe enduring threat that these extremists pose to the united states and to europe andto others. you know, one of the�one of the differencesbetween post-world war ii and pre-world war ii is that war and no war were pretty muchblack and white. you were either at war or
you weren�t at war. but the kind of challengethat we face from terrorism and other extremists today is more like a public health problemor crime that we are going to have to battle on an enduring basis, and there won�t bea moment when any of these groups say we surrender or we quit. and so we�re going to have todeal with this, i believe, on a long-term basis.i think we have to be very careful about drawing this line between exercising our leadershipin the world, and leading from the front, and having a credible deterrent, and havingour allies and friends know that we are a dependable ally; and drawing the line betweenaccomplishing those objectives and, in effect, as the term goes, becoming the world policeman.and it was one of the reasons why i opposed
the intervention in libya. i did not see ourinterests directly engaged. and i said in the situation room�i said, can i just finishthe two wars i�m already in before you go looking for another one? so i think�i thinkwe can and we must draw that line. but we have to�we have to accomplish the missionof the first part of that that i described, and we do have to continue to fight theseextremists that pose a very real threat to us.brokaw: i want to thank you, mr. gates, for this really enlightening hour. and i justwant to conclude, if i can, with this one observation. i�ve long admired secretarygates� commitment to public service, the intelligence that he brings, the strengthof his ideas. there was just one pause in
this book that did give me a moment of secondthoughts. as the director of the cia, he saw on hisagenda that he was going to be speaking at indiana university, which is one of his almamaters. so he invited lee hamilton, who was a congressman from indiana and a highly regardednational security authority in the congress of the united states, to join him on the ciaplane for this appointment. they got onto the plane together, the plane turned north:they were going to indiana university in pennsylvania, not in indiana. (laughter.) but i give himall kinds of credit for putting that in the book. (laughter.)gates: (laughs.) brokaw: thank you all very much. (applause.)that was really good, bob. (applause.)
(end)this is an uncorrected transcript.
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